Labor market search, nominal rigidities and monetary propagation by Lee, Junhee & Kwon, Hyeog Ug
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Labor market search, nominal rigidities and
monetary propagation
Author(s) Lee, Junhee; Kwon, Hyeog Ug
Citation Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 47(1): 99-114
Issue Date 2006-06
Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version publisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10086/7649










College of Economics, Nihon University




Business cycle models with nominal rigidities do not readily generate persistent and hump
shaped aggregate output dynamics to monetary shocks. In this paper, we consider labor
market search in models with nomial rigidities to obtain realistic monetary propagation. While
existing research combined labor market search with nominal price stickiness, greater persis-
tence and hump shaped output dynamics as well as plausible labor market movements are
obtained when labor market search is combined with nominal wage stickiness rather than
nominal price stickiness.
Keywords: Labor market search, Nominal rigidities
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32
I. Introduction
Labor market seach models like Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) have become widely
used in the modern explanation of unemployment. These models have also been used in
business cycle research. Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) ﬁrst combined labor market
search with a real business cycle model to explain business cycle regularities. den-Haan et al.
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comments. The secnd author gratefully acknowledges the Grint-in-Aid from New Energy and Industrial Technol-
ogy Development Organization(grant No.0624006).
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Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 47 (2006), pp.99-114.  Hitotsubashi University(2000) added endogenous job destruction in a real business cycle model with labor market
search and made the e#ects of productivity shocks more pronouced and persistent. Labor
market search has also been incorporated into monetary business cycle models. Cooley and
Quadrini (1999) combined labor market search with a limited participation model of money
and found that many important qualitative features of labor markets and the Phillips curve
relation are captured by doing so.
Recently labor market search is introduced into the so-called New Keynesian type models
with nominal price stickiness to improve on the models’ weak propagation of monetary shocks
as noted by Chari et al. (2000) and Dotsey and King (2001). But it cannot be determined yet
whether labor market search signiﬁcantly enhances the performance of the models with
nominal price stickiness. Walsh (2002) shows that labor market search can induce a delayed
and hump-shaped output response to a monetary shock. The model includes a ‘cost channel’
of monetary shocks, however, which is not tied closely with labor market search or nominal
price stickiness. Trigari (2004) also builds a business cycle model with labor market search and
nominal price stickiness. The model generates plausible dynamics of output, but it incorporates
habit formation, which is controversial.
1 Krause and Lubik (2003) ﬁnd that a business cycle
model with labor market search and Rotemberg-type quadratic price adjustment costs does not
generate any substantial propagation of monetary shocks.
In this paper, we consider nominal wage stickiness in stead of or in additon to nominal
price stickiness in monetary business cycle models with labor market search to obtain realistic
monetary propagation and plausible labor market dynamics. Our model can be thought of a
variant of New Keynesian models and we are basically trying to improve on the performance
of the models with nominal rigidities as Christiano et al. (2005) by incorporating labor market
search. The main ﬁndings from this attempt can be summarized as follows. First, nominal
wage stickiness combined with labor market search can be an important mechanism in
generating delayed and hump shaped responses of aggregate variables to monetary shocks.
Second, monetary shocks can also generate plausible labor market dynamics such as a negative
correlation between job creation and destruction rate when we combine nominal wage
stickiness and labor market search. Our attempt will be interesting in the following respects.
First, Walsh (2002) and Trigari (2004) incorporated nominal price stickiness into monetary
business cycle models with labor market search, but no attempt has been made to incorporate
nominal wage stickiness in those models. Second, Krause and Lubik (2003) combined Hall
(2004) type real wage rigidity and Rotemberg-type quadratic price adjustment costs in a model
with labor market search. While their model can be broadly interpreted to have incorporated
both nominal price and wage stickiness, the e#ects of nominal wage stickiness alone cannot be
analyzed in their model. Also, Krause and Lubik (2003) ﬁnd no substantial propagation of
monetary shocks in their model, but we observe delayed and hump shaped responses of
economic variables to monetary shocks in our model with nominal wage stickiness. Finally,
nominal wage stickiness is naturally introduced in our model following Hall (2004) without
relying on monopolistic wage setting unions, which may not play a signiﬁcant role in the US
economy but are typically assumed in models with nominal wage stickiness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we construct the model. We ﬁrst
write down a ﬂexible wage version of the model so that we can refer to it afterward and then
1 See Karen (2000) and Otrok et al. (2002) for some evidences against habit formation.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +**incorporate nominal wage stickiness into it. In section 3, we characterize the equilibrium of the
model and calibrate parameters. In section 4, we summarize ﬁndings from our benchmark
model and its variants. And in section 5, we conclude.
II. The Model
Our model is a monetary business cycle model with labor market search based on Cooley
and Quadrini (1999). We will introduce nominal wage stickiness al aFischer (1977) into it in
our benchmark case.
In each period t, the model economy experiences an event st in St. We denote by s
t(s0,
…, st) the history of states of the economy up through and including period t. The probability
as of period 0, of any particular history s
t is p(s
t). The initial realization s0 is given. The
economy is populated with workers (or households) and ﬁrms distributed on the interval [0,1)
respectively.
1. Households
Workers as households purchase consumption goods and acquire real balances. They also
supply labor to the ﬁrms when they engage in production; otherwise they search for a job. We
















t)a n db are consumption, real balances, labor hours and
exogenous unemployment beneﬁts respectively. Momentary utility function is
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where c is an indicator function which equals 1 if the worker (or household) is employed and









































t) is real labor income, Pi(s
t) is the nominal proﬁt transfer from ﬁrms, and Ti(s
t)i s
the nominal transfer from the government. Bi(s
t1) is state dependent nominal bond claim
(amount) and a bond which pays one dollar in state s
t1 costs Q(s
t1s
t) dollars in state s
t.
Households’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to consumption, money and bond holdings can
be obtained by maximizing (1) subject to (3).
2 We assume a utility function linear in the consumption to avoid complications with heterogeneity.
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Flexible wage
To produce the good used for ﬁnal consumption and investment, a ﬁrm and a worker need
to be matched. We assume, without loss of generality, that there is a single ﬁrm for each
worker so that each ﬁrm hires only one worker. Firms searching for a worker incur a ﬁxed ﬂow
cost of k due to vacancy posting. Workers searching for a job (or ﬁrm) do not face any search






t)f2, *0a n df1, f20( 4 )
where v(s
t) is the number of vacancies posted by ﬁrms, u(s
t) is the number of workers
searching for a job, and y(v(s
t), u(s
t)) is the number of newly formed matches in the economy.
The probability that a ﬁrm ﬁnds a worker, denoted by q
f(s










The probability that a worker ﬁnds a job, denoted by q
w(s










If a ﬁrm and a worker are successfully matched, the matched pair may operate through






a,0 a1( 7 )
where h(s
t) is labor hours and k(s
t) is capital input. Firms act in a perfectly competitive market
and sell their output at the price P(s
t). The period t proﬁt of a representative ﬁrm in real terms







where r is real rental rate of capital and w(s
t, +) is real wage. + is an idiosyncratic cost factor
which is independently and identically distributed across ﬁrms and the states of the economy
with a distribution function F:[ 0 ,]  [0, 1]. Matches may not produce if the realization
of + is too high. We denote the value of + above which matches decide not to produce as + ¯( s
t)
(endogenous separation margin, henceforth) and we note that it is a function of the state of
the economy s
t. The probability that matches will not produce due to high enough realization
of + is, then, 1F(+ ¯( s
t)). We also assume that matches separate exogenously with a
probability of x
x, apart from the endogenous separation.
3 A matched ﬁrm and worker pair sets
real wage w(s
t, +) so that the worker gets a constant share h of the surplus generated by the
match following standard literature.
Let J(s
t, +) be the value of a match for a matched ﬁrm expressed in real terms. Then
3 Exogenous job separation may occur in the real world due to retirement or some other non-economic reasons.











t1, +)dF(+)( 9 )
That is, J(s
t, +) is the sum of current period (or period t) real proﬁt and the next period
discounted expected value of a match for the ﬁrm provided that the ﬁrm remains matched.
4
Let Q(s























t) consists of three parts. First, vacancy posting costs k. Second, we assume matches
formed in period t start to produce only at period t1, and thus a successful match (which
occurs with probability of q
f(s
t)) contributes to Q(s
t) as a form of next period discounted
expected value of a match.
5 Third, a vacancy posting ﬁrm cannot ﬁnd a worker with
probability (1q
f(s
t)) and gets another chance of posting a vacancy in the next period. In
















We can interpret (11) as an arbitrage condition for vacancy posting. It says that, in
equilibrium, the vacancy posting cost (k) equals the discounted expected value of a successful
match (which occurs with probability of q
f(s
t)). It is also helpful in computation to express the




























t, +) be the value of a match for a matched worker and U(s
t) be the value of being
unemployed. Then M(s


























t, +) consists of three parts. First, a matched worker gets a real wage net of the disutility
of work in the current period.
6 Second, the worker can get at least the value of being
4 Here, we utilize the fact that the value of a discontinued match for a ﬁrm is zero.
5 Because labor market matching is a time-consuming process, we follow the literature in assuming that new
matches may start to produce with a lag of one period.
6 Given the utility function linear in consumption, we can express the disutility of labor in real terms as in (13).
2006] A67DG B6G@:I H:6G8=, CDB>C6A G><>9>I>:H 6C9 BDC:I6GN EGDE6<6I>DC +*-unemployed for all cases in the next period. Third, if the worker remains matched and
produces in the next period, he or she gets the extra value of the match over that of being
unemployed. The value of being unemployed, U(s






















t) consists of three parts. First, an unemployed worker gets some exogenous beneﬁts in the
current period, denoted b. Second, the unemployed worker can get at least the value of being
unemployed in the next period. Third, the unemployed worker can be matched with a ﬁrm with
the probability q
w(s
t) and if the match does not separate and does engage in production, the
worker gets the extra value of the match over that of being unemployed in the next period.
Using (9) - (14) and the constant match surplus sharing rule, real wage rate, w(s
t, +), can



































A matched ﬁrm and worker pair jointly maximizes the total surplus, subject to the production
































Thus, the marginal product of capital is equated to its rental rate and the marginal product of
labor (labor hours) is equated to the marginal disutility of labor. A matched pair breaks up
endogenously whenever + is higher than the endogenous separation margin, + ¯( s
t). + ¯( s
t) can be
characterized with the condition that total surplus is zero. And we note that if total surplus is
zero then J(s
t, + ¯( s
t))0 thanks to the constant match surplus sharing rule. Then using (9),
(11) and J(s
t, + ¯( s
t))0, we obtain the following condition to determine + ¯( s
t) in equilibrium.
z(s







In this section, we introduce nominal wage stickiness al aFischer (1977) instead of
assuming ﬂexible wages.
7 We suppose that it is costly to negotiate wages every period, leading
ﬁrms and workers negotiate wages at intervals of N periods for the next N periods. The
matches are indexed by i as follows: those indexed i[0, 1/N) determine new wages in 0, N,
7 Other features of the model remain unchanged, if not mentioned otherwise.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +*.2N and so on; those indexed i[1/N,2 / N) determine new wages in 1, N1, 2N1; and so
on, for the N cohorts of matches. But unlike commonly adopted Calvo or Taylor type nominal
wage stickiness, we do not restrict wages to be the same throughout the N subsequent periods
after an adjustment. Corresponding to each cohort of matches, ﬁrms and workers are indexed
so that matches in the cohort [0, 1/N) are formed by ﬁrms indexed i[0, 1/N) and workers
indexed j[0, 1/N); matches in the cohort [1/N,2 / N) are formed by ﬁrms indexed i[1/N,
2/N) and workers indexed j[1/N,2 / N); and so on. Given the restriction on match
formation, it is natural that the labor market matching process is shared only in the same
cohort or between pair cohorts. Namely ﬁrms indexed i[0, 1/N) share the processes with
other ﬁrms indexed i [0, 1/N), workers indexed j[0, 1/N) share the processes with other
workers indexed j [0, 1/N), and ﬁrms indexed i[0, 1/N) share the processes with workers
indexed j[0, 1/N); and so on. Then there will be N di#erent matching processes comprised
of matching function, job-ﬁnding probability and worker-ﬁnding probability corresponding to
(4) - (6) in the ﬂexible wage setting.
Without loss of generality, we consider a match i, which predetermines wages in period
tm. The labor contract signed between the ﬁrm and the worker in the match speciﬁes rules
for the wage determination and the labor hours.
8 The rule for the wage determination will be
detailed below. The rule for labor hours is assumed to be the same as the labor hours optimality
















Thus while wages are set in advance, labor hours are adjusted to equate the marginal disutility
of labor to the marginal productivity of labor period by period depending on the state of the
economy. We denote the nominal wage predetermined for the period tmg in period tm
as Wtmgtm. Given the predetermined wage (which will be detailed below), the period tm

























which is the same as that in the ﬂexible wage setup.
We can now specify the rule for the wage determination. Nominal wages are predeter-
mined every N periods for the next N periods in advance so that the corresponding real wages
for the next N periods are set to be the expected values of the real wages if the wage setting















8 Given predetermined wages, rules for labor hours are also required since ﬁrms will demand as many labor
hours as possible and workers will supply as few hours as possible without such rules.

















for g1, , N (22)
where w* i(s

































Since the wages are set in advance conditional on the match not being separated endogenously,
we need to integrate out the idiosyncratic factor conditional on its being smaller than the
separation margin in the period tmg and thus we have F(+ ¯ i(s
tmg)) as an integrating
factor.
Given the predetermined wages and input rules, we can also characterize the endogenous
job destruction condition as
zi(s







which is analogous to the endogenous job destruction condition (18) in the ﬂexible wage setup
and can be derived by the same procedures used in the ﬂexible wage setup.
9 And we can





























Since nominal wages are predetermined, these can cause ine$ciencies and there can be
mutual beneﬁts to the ﬁrm and worker from re-adjusting the wage ex post as noted by Barro
(1977), Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Hall (2004). That is, the predetermined wage cannot be
enforced so it cannot exist. We would like to rule out this problem based on the following
reasons. First, as pointed out by Hall (2004), rigid wage (nominal wage stickiness in our
model) does not cause ine$ciencies in labor market matching models as long as the rigid wage
remains within the bargaining range of wage (the di#erence between the reservation wage of
the ﬁrm and the worker). Thus, when the bargaining range is wide enough
10 and shocks are
small enough, regular wage negotiations in every N period will su$ce to keep the rigid wage
9 It is assumed that workers always want to be employed given predetermined wages and thus there is no
separating condition reﬂecting workers’ willingness to separate.
10 Empirically, Blanchﬂower et. al (1996) ﬁnd range of pay is, for rent-sharing reasons alone, approximately
24% the mean wage, suggesting wide bargaining range. In our benchmark model, worker’s share of match surplus
is 52% real wage at the steady state.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +*0stay within the bargaining range. Then there will be no ine$ciency in the ﬁrst place. This
argument can apply easily in the special case of our model when we do not allow endogenous
separation of matches as in Hall (2004). When we allow endogenous separation of matches,
this argument does not apply exactly since bargaining range can be as small as zero due to the
idiosyncratic cost factor. So there will be some matches which will experience ine$ciencies.
Second, for those matches which experience ine$ciencies due to predetermined wages, we
assume that they also do not readjust wages due to some non-economic concerns. That is,
given other majority of matches do not readjust wages, these matches also ﬁnd it better not to
adjust wage and rather break up due to some social and psychological concerns such as fairness
at work place.
The matching processes
Since we have N di#erent cohorts of matches, there will be N di#erent matching processes.
We consider the ith cohort matching processes without loss of generality.


















Thus, workers employed at the beginning of period t1 separate with the rate xi(s
t1) during
the period t1 and the remaining workers stay employed at the beginning of period t.I n
addition, workers who found a job in period t1 are also employed at the beginning of period









t) unemployed workers search for a job from the beginning of period t and xi(s
t)
ni(s
t) separated workers in period t also search for a job possibly to produce in the next period.
Job creation and destruction rates are of independent interest. We deﬁne them following
den-Haan et al. (2000). Job creation rate, denoted jci(s













Thus, job creation rate is the proportion of newly-created matches out of total employed
workers (or matches), net of the proportion of matches serving to reﬁll the vacancies resulting
from exogenous separation.
11 Job destruction rate, denoted jdi(s








That is, job destruction rate is the separation rate, net of the proportion of matches serving to
reﬁll the vacancies resulting from exogenous separation.
11 den-Haan et. al. (2000) interpret matches serving to reﬁll the vacancies resulting from exogenous separation
are not new job creation.
2006] A67DG B6G@:I H:6G8=, CDB>C6A G><>9>I>:H 6C9 BDC:I6GN EGDE6<6I>DC +*1We will be eventually interested in the aggregate (or economy-wide) numbers of em-
ployed workers, workers looking for a job and so on instead of the cohort-wide numbers. These
aggregate numbers are calculated as the weighted averages of the corresponding cohort-wide
numbers, using the masses of the cohorts or employment shares as the weights.
3. Capital Supply
We introduce capital leasing ﬁrms for ease of analysis. Capital is provided by competitive









































t) is capital supply and i(s
t) is investment. a is capital adjustment cost parameter and
d is the depreciation rate of capital. First order conditions with respect to investment and
capital can be obtained by maximizing (31) subject to (32).
4. Monetary Shocks





The growth rate of money, m(s






t) is independently, identically and normally distributed with mean zero and





III. Computation of Equilibrium and Parametrization
1. Computing the Equilibrium
We impose market-clearing conditions and resource constraints in addition to conditions
obtained from agents’ optimization problems and law of motions to deﬁne equilibrium. We
then use a standard log-linearization method such as Sims (2002) to compute the solution.
The parameters are taken mainly from Cooley and Quadrini (1999). Time period is a
quarter. Subjective discount factor, b, is set to be 0.98. The labor hours disutility parameter,
g, is set to be 2. The weight of labor disutility in the momentary utility function, , is
12 This law of motion comes from Chari et al. (2000).
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +*2calibrated so that the share of time allocated to the labor hours is around 1/3 of the available
time. Exogenous unemployment beneﬁts, b, is assumed to be zero. We set the interest elasticity
parameter, z, to be 2.56 and the weight of real balance in the momentary utility function, w,
to be 0.66 on the basis of the estimate of the money demand function in Chari et al. (2000).
13
Exogenous job separation rate parameter, x
x, is set to be 0.068 following den Haan et al.
(2000).
14 For the Cobb-Douglas matching function parameters, we set f10.6 and f20.4.
We ﬁx the steady state value of the probability that a ﬁrm ﬁnds a worker, q
f*,t ob e0 . 7a n d
steady state value of the probability that a worker ﬁnds a job, q
w*, to be 0.6. We set steady state
value of the number of workers employed, n*, to be 0.94 implying a steady state unemployment
rate of 0.06. Given these restrictions, the parameter * in the matching function and steady
state value of the endogenous separation margin, + ¯ *, can be determined. We assume that the
idiosyncratic cost factor, +, follows an exponential distribution with parameter r. Then using
the steady state relationship of (24) and (25), we can set the value for the parameter r together
with the vacancy posting cost parameter, k. We set the Cobb-Douglas production function
parameter, a, to be 0.36 and the capital depreciation rate parameter, d, to be 0.025. Also we
set the monetary shock parameters rm and sem to be 0.48 and 0.00623 respectively. The capital
adjustment cost parameter, a, is adjusted to match the relative volatility of investment to
output with the corresponding data statistic as in Chari et al. (2000). Surplus sharing
parameter h is set to be 0.5 following den-Haan et al. (2000). Finally we set N to be 4 so that
wages are predetermined for one year.
IV. Findings
1. Benchmark Case
Figure 1 plots the responses of variables to a standard deviation monetary shock in the
benchmark model. Total output, labor, investment and consumption all increase due to the
monetary shock. Job destruction rate falls due to the monetary shock while job creation rate
rises initially and then falls below the steady state before returning to it.
When the monetary shock hits the economy, demand for (ﬁnal) good increases. But the
real wage goes down due to the nominal wage stickiness. Wage costs then fall, raising ﬁrm
proﬁts. And due to the increased ﬁrm’s proﬁts, the endogenous job destruction margin goes up
as can be seen from the condition (24). And thus fewer ﬁrm and worker matches break up
endogenously. Further, vacancy posting increases because of the expectation of the falling real
wage costs and rising proﬁts in the future as can be seen from the job posting arbitrage
condition (25). This pulls up employment and pushes down unemployment. Also the job
destruction rate goes down and job creation rate goes up. Finally total output, consumption,
total investment all increase due to the rise of employment.
We observe somewhat delayed e#ects of the monetary shock. That is, total output,
consumption and labor peak two periods after the shock, instead of reaching their maxima in
13 We do not follow Cooley and Quadrini (1999) strictly in inroducing demand for money via cash in advance
constraint. Instead, we induce demand for money via money in utility function as in Chari et al. (2000).
14 Cooley and Quadrini (1999) do not assume exogenous separation.
2006] A67DG B6G@:I H:6G8=, CDB>C6A G><>9>I>:H 6C9 BDC:I6GN EGDE6<6I>DC +*3the ﬁrst period and declining thereafter. This occurs for the following reasons: When the shock
hits the economy, endogenous separation decreases and this increases total output, consump-
tion and labor initially. But the maximum e#ects on those variables are realized in the second
period when newly formed matches are beginning to be productive after the time-consuming
process of labor market matching. Finally we observe job creation decreases below the steady
state after the ﬁrst period. This is due to the (gradual) rise of the real wage per job and the fall
of the worker ﬁnding rate. It becomes unproﬁtable to post vacancies after the ﬁrst period due
to the rising wage costs (to the steady state) and the low rate of ﬁnding a worker.
Table 1 shows autocorrelations of output growth in the model. The model economy
exhibits persistence in output growth as shown by the positive ﬁrst-order autocorrelation.
Table 2 shows some correlations among job creation, destruction rate and employment. The
15 All variables are in log-deviation form. The shock hits the economy at 1st period.
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data.
2. Comparison with Nominal Price Stickiness
In this section, we compare our benchmark model with nominal wage stickiness with
models with nominal price stickiness as in Walsh (2002) and Trigari (2004).
18
Figure 2 shows the response of variables to one standard deviation monetary shock when
nominal price stickiness (not nominal wage stickiness) is introduced into the ﬂexible wage
search model. Now the response of total output, labor, consumption and investment do not
display delayed and hump shaped dynamics. Also job creation and destruction rate do not
show the negative correlation observed in the data, and instead they move together very
closely.
When the monetary shock hits the economy, demand for ﬁnal goods increases and
16 Statistics for the model model economy are computed on HP-detrended data generated by simulating the
model for 200 periods and repeating the simulation 100 times. The statistics are average over these 100 simula-
tions. Statistics for the US economy are computed using HP-detrended data from 1959.1 through 1996.4.
17 See the footnote for table1.
18 See Walsh (2002) and Trigari (2004) for detailed setup.
T67A: 1.16 AJID8DGG:A6I>DC D; OJIEJI GGDLI=
Autocorrelation at lags
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1
Benchmark
0.27 0.40 0.23 0.48
Sticky Price
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.49
U.S. Economy
0.04 0.07 0.22 0.20
T67A: 2.17 CGDHH-8DGG:A6I>DC D; EBEADNB:CI,J D7 CG:6I>DC
6C9 JD7 D:HIGJ8I>DC
Correlation at lags and leads
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t1t 2t 3
Benchmark Model
corr(Cretk,E m p t) 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.75 0.68 0.34 0.02
corr(Destk,E m p t) 0.24 0.66 0.96 0.41 0.08 0.15 0.25
corr(Cretk,D e s t) 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.65 0.68 0.39
Sticky Price
corr(Cretk,E m p t) 0.05 0.32 0.99 0.32 0.02 0.09 0.13
corr(Destk,E m p t) 0.09 0.32 0.90 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
corr(Cretk,D e s t) 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.90 0.33 0.07 0.03
U.S. Economy
corr(Cretk,E m p t) 0.27 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.58 0.68 0.60
corr(Destk,E m p t) 0.63 0.65 0.59 0.35 0.01 0.29 0.45
corr(Cretk,D e s t) 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.14 0.18 0.34
2006] A67DG B6G@:I H:6G8=, CDB>C6A G><>9>I>:H 6C9 BDC:I6GN EGDE6<6I>DC +++production rises. But more production is mainly done by breaking up less with existing workers
rather than hiring new workers initiated by posting vacancies. That is fewer vacancies are
posted expecting rapid (real) wage increase when wages are ﬂexible. And increased demands
in the ﬁrst period due to nominal price stickiness are met by separating less with existing
workers. Accordingly, we do not observe any delayed response of economic variables initiated
by more vacancy posting. Since vacancy posting drops from the beginning due to rapid wage
adjustments, total vacancies and unemployment show almost a perfect positive correlation.
Accordingly job creation and destruction rates decrease together showing strong positive
correlation.
19 All variables are in log-deviation form. The shock hits the economy at 1st period.
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Monetary business cycle models with nominal rigidities have their weakness in producing
persistent and hump shaped aggregate output responses to monetary shocks. Several ways to
improve on this weakness have been suggested in the literature, but they are sometimes
controversial and often ad hoc. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of obtaining
realistic propagation of monetary shocks by combining labor market matching and nominal
wage stickiness. We ﬁnd that nominal wage stickiness and labor market matching can be
important propagation mechanism in inducing realistic dynamics of aggregate output to
monetary shocks as well as plausible labor market movements.
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